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Summary
Reporting systems are becoming more widespread in healthcare. Since they may become mandatory under the
pressure of insurance companies and administrative organizations, it is important to begin to go beyond a 
case-by-case approach and to move to a system where there is a general reflection on the best conditions of
development and setting up of such systems in medicine. In this paper, we review existing reporting systems,
break down their components, examine how they are constructed and propose some ideas on how to articulate
them in a dynamic process in order to improve the validity of the tool as mediator of safety, quality and 
well-being at work.
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Following their development in industrial and avia-
tion areas, accident reporting systems are becoming
more widespread in healthcare. The intention behind
their implementation is to systematically collate and
analyse the risks associated with medical activities in
order to propose remedial and preventative actions.
Several factors can explain the expansion of such sys-
tems in the medical sector. First, the progress of
technology in general together with the develop-
ment of increased technology in medicine itself have
shed light on the role played by human errors in
medical accidents. Reporting systems therefore first
focused on the identification of patient injuries
attributable to human errors. Second, the relation-
ships between doctors and patients have changed and
the public has been calling for clearer information
concerning the risks associated with medicine. Third,
litigation for medical negligence has increased to
such an extent in many English-speaking countries
that insurance companies, administration organiza-
tions and state health ministries have pressed for the
development of strategies that can proactively pre-
vent injuries. Professional organizations also have
played a role in the development of reporting sys-
tems. Fearing medico-legal consequences, doctors
and hospital staff have started to become aware of the
need to change the myth of an error-free system in
medicine and see in reporting systems one means to
change culture and attitude towards human errors.
In a recent report produced by the Quality of
Health Care in America project [1], different existing
reporting systems in medicine were reviewed. They
varied according to a number of features. Some sys-
tems were mandatory by internal or external struc-
tures, whereas others were voluntary and confidential.
Some systems focused on adverse patient injuries
while others were extended to any event which could
have, or did harm, anyone in the hospital, including
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staff and visitors. Some systems aggregate data, others
propose remedial actions as well as feedback to 
the reporters. Besides this variety, it is imperative to
go beyond a case-by-case experience and to start a
general reflection on the best conditions of develop-
ment and setting up of such systems in healthcare.
The Belgian Federal Government Prime Minister’s
Offices provide the opportunity for this work to be
co-ordinated. A multi-disciplinary research network
including legal specialists, doctors, psychologists and
a medical administrator has been set up to develop
proposals for ongoing reporting and analysis of failures
and accidents in the context of Belgian healthcare. 
In this review, we present the first reflections of this
network. We break down reporting system compo-
nents, see how they are elaborated and propose some
ideas on how to combine them in a dynamic process
in order to improve the validity of the tool.
Reporting system process
Figure 1 describes the many different functional 
steps that must be fulfilled in order to drive any
reporting system: development of the reporting inter-
face, data collection, data analysis, recommendations,
implementation and evaluation.
Accident/incident/event
A reporting system, by definition, is a systematic
gathering of information about accidents. The first
difficulty is that of the definition of an accident. We
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Reporting system components. Grey rectangles
represent reporting system steps, white rectangles
represent the products of each step.
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have found at least three different meanings to the
term accident and error within the working group:
one psychological, one medical and one legal.
Ambiguity can thus arise about what the system
aims to collect as information. Traditionally, report-
ing systems have focused on accidents due to human
errors. In recent years they have extended their scope
to critical events that either could have or did harm
someone. This has the advantage of favouring the
collection concerning any type of problem situation,
including those that ordinarily come up at work but
which do not bring on harmful consequences
because they have been treated in time (this incident
category is also referred as a ‘near miss’).
There are several biases in what is reported. A
study carried out in an Australian hospital [2] shows
that in 80% of cases, the accident reports are gener-
ated by nurses and they are generally limited to the
problems which are relevant to nurses, such as med-
ication problems. Due to this bias, the reports can-
not be used as a statistical basis for estimating
accident probability.
Capturing the event
Reporting is achieved by means of an interface.
Three types of interface can be used: questionnaire
(or reporting form), interview and automatic data
record. The most common interface used is the ques-
tionnaire. In certain hospitals, there are more than
eight separate cards to fill out. The tendency is thus
to avoid the reporting procedure and to report only
the accidents that lead to serious harm to the patient.
The questionnaire is usually presented in the form of
a multi-axial framework comprised of questions and
scales measuring several variables concerning the
event. The question format can be either closed
(multiple choice) or open-ended (narrative section).
The content of the questionnaire is predetermined
and, at the same time, reflects the model of causality
that the designer has of the event. Thus, in identify-
ing questionnaire content, it is best to first list the
risks on which information is to be collected. This
can be done on empirical observations or on a theo-
retical basis. In recent years, a consensus has appeared
among researchers to consider an accident as a symp-
tom of a human-system mismatch resulting from
multiple causes rather than of one unique cause
(technical or human). This means that most of the
time, there are questions concerning multiple data
including technical, organizational and individual
variables. Questionnaires allow for the collection of
highly structured information about accidents, but,
at the same time, the predetermined structure involves
a loss of information. The use of interviews can help
to reduce this bias. Nevertheless, interviews come with
a high cost in time and resources, and experience is
required to collect valuable information.
Recently, another type of interface has been used
to collect information about accidents. Sanborn and
colleagues [3] have used a computerized anaesthesia
information management system to scan case records
electronically for deviations from specific limits for
physiological variables. Such interfaces are extremely
valuable in measuring frequencies and sequences of
patient data, but the sheer size of the automated
recorded information is difficult to use with a view to
develop or verify causal analysis between the related
accident variables.
Data analysis
Reporting systems include a method to analyse data
and involve a classification scheme. In many reporting
systems, the classification scheme is built empiri-
cally on the basis of the reported data and is domain
specific. As example, the Generic Occurrence Clas-
sification developed by Runciman and colleagues [4]
is specifically for the medical field. It was con-
structed by an iterative process in which ‘natural cat-
egories’ were identified from over 2000 incidents
and 800 adverse events, and placed in a hierarchical
structure [5]. In other reporting systems, the classifi-
cation is derived from psychological models and
makes a distinction, for example, between slips and
mistakes [6] or between active and latent failures.
Even if there is now a consensus among experts to
define an accident as a system failure, analyses illus-
trating the multi-causal aspect of an accident are still
rare. In most studies, the related accident variables
(technical, individual and organizational) are consid-
ered in isolation. There are, in fact, few techniques
that can be used to describe the relationships between
these variables. The causal tree diagram has been
used by several researchers to visualize graphically
the multiple conditions leading to an accident [7,8].
In recent years, several investigators have looked
farther into the idea of the multi-causality of acci-
dents and have questioned the extent to which a set
of factors extracted from analyses of accidents are
important influences on accidents compared to
events or histories [9,10]. In other words, does think-
ing about accident characteristics tell us about why
failures occur at work? For example, in order to
understand the significance of someone’s behaviour
at work, knowing about the associated factors is cer-
tainly important, but what may be much more rele-
vant is the ‘history’ of the person in the context of
how the event came over time. The idea is to provide
a description of the environment that was directly
relevant to the conducting of the behaviour. From this
perspective, it is the constant processes of interaction
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between the person and the environment that is
important, rather than particular characteristics of
the person or the environment at any particular
time. The major challenge is to distil the cases into a
smaller number of scenarios containing the critical
issues concerning accident analyses. Cook and col-
leagues [10] have used the technique to collect a
series of cases in anaesthesia illustrating some
generic cognitive difficulties. One immediate impli-
cation of this approach is that the initial assessment
using formal categories and showing human error as
the major cause of accidents should be supplemented
by techniques that can assess behaviour in context.
Construction of remedial and preventative
actions
The next step of a reporting system consists of the 
proposal of remedial and preventative actions. Differ-
ent approaches can be used to construct them. The
‘Classification/Action Matrix’ developed by van
Vuuren [6] determines a priori the most effective
actions according to the category of failure. In the
Edinburgh intensive care unit’s reporting system [11],
the remedial actions are constructed in a collaborative
process by a group of experts based on the results of
the data analyses. Since the database can be very large
and diverse, there is a need for setting priorities.
Traditionally, responses in healthcare have been set on
rates of mortality and severe injuries. But a broader
approach is required as much of the cost of iatrogenic
injury is created by high-frequency and relatively low-
severity events. The responses can be very diverse; they
may imply technological, ergonomic, organizational
or training measures. They may be set at different
levels: individual, departmental, systematic, national
and international. These measures are not exclusive.
It is clear that reporting systems are based on the
confidence established between the reporter and the
analysis made of the reported data. But it is now rec-
ognized that feedback plays an important role in the
long-term adherence of the staff to the system.
Implementation and follow-up
The main critical step in a reporting system is certainly
the implementation and follow-up phases. Indeed,
reporting systems have been implemented in many
hospitals, but then abandoned. There are several rea-
sons for this: the length of the questionnaire, the lack
of user involvement, the fear of blame, the lack of feed-
back and the running costs. Some recommendations
have been made in the Quality of Health Care in
America project as well as in the Australian report
made by Runciman [12] and colleagues. In our view,
successful implementation involves establishment of
the framework well ahead of time. This implies that
the goal of the reporting system is clearly established
and understood by the different partners.
Four frames must be considered: medical, techni-
cal, organizational and legal. At the level of the med-
ical frame, the collaboration and the involvement of
the domain experts is indispensable to the collection
and analysis of the data. At the level of the technical
frame, the techniques of analysis (classification and
accident formalization) together with their tools
must be chosen according to the goal pursued. It is
necessary to determine the form in which (computer-
ized, verbal or written) the tools and the data would
be accessible to the various users (the reporters and
the analysts). The technical frame must be suffi-
ciently flexible in order to be able to be adapted to
the various possible uses (safety improvement, learn-
ing or research). At the organizational level, design-
ers should make sure that the reporting system
project is positioned, from the beginning, within a
culture of quality and patient safety improvement
rather than a ‘blame culture’. A large part of the effec-
tiveness of the system depends on this. Several struc-
tural points must also be negotiated with the
administration staff such as who will be responsible
for the system, who will have access to the system and
how that should be done, the degree to which infor-
mation will be confidential or anonymous and what
kind of feedback and dissemination of information
will be given. Such questions should have an answer
before the implementation of the system in order to
favour its long-term usability within the system. The
last frame, the legal frame, is certainly as delicate as
the organizational frame. At that level, the data gath-
ered, along with the reporters and the managers of
the systems must be protected. The protection can be
developed along two axes: a legal axis and a prag-
matic axis. On the legal axis, there is already a series
of protections that are registered in the laws (e.g. pro-
fessional secrecy) and that can, possibly, be taken into
account. However, we can also imagine that the leg-
islature could grant some kind of privileged status 
to reporting systems that would protect them from
legal investigations. On the pragmatic axis, it is 
possible to ensure protection through several tech-
niques: a confidential processing of information 
collected, a transmission of information in an anony-
mous way and a de-identification of the reports once
completed.
Assessment
Up until now, reporting systems which include 
an assessment phase have been rare. Although the
principal goal of the reporting systems is to create a
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database and identify the risk of accidents in order to
reduce them, they affect culture and also produce
changes in the people who are working within the
system. For this reason, it is important to assess the
tool in context and evaluate what short- and long-
term effects they have on the general work situation.
The scope of the reporting can be evaluated, the clas-
sification and analysis schemes can be reviewed
according to their practicability. The effectiveness of
the remedial and preventive actions can be studied
in short- and long-term perspectives.
Application of the Incident Reporting 
System in Belgium
In 1999, the Belgian Federal Government Prime
Minister’s Offices funded our research group to con-
duct an incident monitoring pilot project as a method
to improve well-being at work. Theoretical founda-
tions for this can be found in the scientific literature
on ‘risks in high-performance work systems’ show-
ing the role played by organizational factors. Many
experts in human factors encourage a culture shift
which acknowledges that providers do not fail alone.
Organizations and systems have vulnerabilities, as
do individuals, and the ingredients of many accidents
are present long before a specific incident occurs.
These latent features, combined with an inexperi-
enced or fatigued caregiver may produce an equip-
ment failure or a medical mishap. We think such a
mishap represent systems failure. Today, more than
ever, healthcare workers face unprecedented demands
for production, safety, efficiency and value. Recent
trends to reduce the financial losses in the healthcare
system have exacerbated pressures on workers lead-
ing in a number of major medical corporations to
strike actions. In a previous study [13], we showed
that 40.4% of the French-speaking anaesthetists
working in three Belgian Universities were suffering
from high-emotional exhaustion (burnout) the high-
est rate concerning young residents under 30 yr old.
The ‘work organization’, more specifically the lack of
control over work, time planning and risks, the lack
of supervision and communication within the team,
especially with the surgeons were perceived as the
major sources of stress. The implication of doctors’
responsibility in accident investigation only increases
these inherent stressful working conditions. Together,
they can lead to impaired performance and health
[14,15].
One of the challenges of this project is to link
quality, security and well-being at work. Our project
is the first of its kind in Belgium. We were aware
that such an information system could, if no precau-
tions were taken, possibly compromise workers 
targeted by the declaration. That is why the working
group which prepared the project included legal 
specialists, doctors and psychologists in order to
resolve the ethical and legal problems of confiden-
tiality and responsibility and to facilitate the change
of culture within the working situation.
We chose to concentrate on one medical specialty
frequently confronted with medical lawsuits, namely
anaesthesia and to apply the process of reporting and
analysing incidents and accidents in two different
anaesthesia departments of university hospitals of
Belgium. The experiment has been progressively
widened to other high-risk hospital sectors such as
intensive care and emergency medicine using the
same specialized reporting form before being extended
to other hospitals with a view to organizing a federal
structure.
A wide variety of reporting systems and relevant
theoretical information has been consulted in order
to develop the reporting form. The actual form1 is
quite detailed and holds fields required for the iden-
tification of the event and other fields necessary for
the administration of the form. It has two components.
Part A contains a free general description (narrative
part) of the incident in which the reporter is asked to
write a description of what happened in their own
words. Part B asks for a detailed description of the
incident using a systematic approach. The form is
prefaced by an invitation to complete the form, ask-
ing the person to report any incident which did, or
could, affect the safety of a patient whether or not it
may be preventable. The identity of the reporter and
the patient do not appear on the report and the exact
time, date or location are not requested.
The narrative description section (Part A) aims to
collect a chronological and logical chain of the events
surrounding the incident in order to obtain a picture
of the history and development of the incident: “In
your own words describe the incident. Include
details about any factors which you believe may have
contributed to, minimized or prevented the inci-
dent. Do you think this incident was preventable?”
Key events will be coded by the analyst into the
database. The objective is to facilitate analyses and
identify risk that might lead to other incidents.
The system-wide event description (Part B) is
designed to elicit the salient features of an incident
placed in the context of the whole. The classification
of the incident begins with the failure itself in terms
of the domain. The idea is based on the concept of
classifying each incident into one or more natural
categories with each incident being linked to its
contributing factors, preventive factors and factors
Reporting systems in healthcare 761
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minimizing outcome (detection factors). Those 
factors can be broken down into four large sub-
classes: equipment factors, individual factors, team
factors and organizational factors. These are summa-
rized in Tables 1–5. The questionnaire is built from
these questions with response boxes inserted in
appropriate places or instructions to circle the cor-
rect responses. In addition, we have integrated into
the form the search for information concerning how
the worker has coped with the event and its impact
on his/her health (Table 5). We, in addition, include
at the end an assessment of the questionnaire itself
asking the person completing it for comments on
clarity, structure and ease of its completion. We
anticipate and hope that it will be possible to docu-
ment the link between safety, quality and well-being
at work in order to improve social or medical sup-
port.
In 1 yr, more than 200 events from the two anaes-
thesia departments in our hospital have been
reported using the same reporting form and coded in
a common database. It is not the purpose of this
review to present the results of the data analysis. It is
useful, however, to report that following our pro-
posed methodology, direct preventive and corrective
responses to specific events have already been recom-
mended and implemented in the two hospitals. This
has improved the frequency of reporting. Among
these, an emergency call procedure has been intro-
duced in order to support junior staff confronted with
dynamic situations, an airway management skills
programme is in place to respond to the frequently
reported difficult intubations, a simulator training
programme has been organized on communication
and crisis management and individual psychological
support is available to provide special support after
accidents.
Our experience has clearly demonstrated that
given a suitable structure and approach, the Incident
Reporting System will be able to provide the data
required to evaluate risks in the health sector with a
view to improving the work. In our experience, the
workers have been closely involved in the project
activities. This constitutes a solid basis for suc-
cessful change at work. In addition, the involvement
of legal specialists and psychologists as partners in
the work group reinforce the legitimacy of the 
project.
Conclusion
These first reflections on reporting systems have, as
their main goal, the ability to attract attention to
one error prevention tool that is becoming more
widespread in healthcare and which is experienced
on a case-by-case basis. From this arises the necessity
of developing a design framework allowing for a
more systematic appraisal of the tool. Our review
illustrates the need for an interdisciplinary team
including domain experts, legal experts, analysts and
psychologists, for successful designing and imple-
menting. The need for an international benchmarking
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Table 1. What happened?
Circuit problem Equipment involved Pharmacological incident
Dilution of gases Airway, mouth prop, gag Allergy
Disconnection Airway pack Contamination
Leak Diathermy, cautery, shock Inappropriate drug
Misconnection Equipment malfunction Interaction
Overpressure Infusion apparatus Overdose
Rebreathing Intubation aid Side-effect
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to align some of the objectives and methodologies
already in use in the existing systems is also evident.
Furthermore, it is important to go beyond the sim-
ple collection of information and to start an in-depth
reflection on the methodology of analysis and on the
way responses are made to reported incidents. It is
clear that computerization of the work sector repre-
sents an ideal means for collecting data about acci-
dents, but in general these databases are hardly ever
used within the system. At the same time, it is
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Table 2. Why did the incident occur?
Contributory factors Minimizing factors Suggested corrective strategies
Equipment
Lack of facilities Monitor detection Additional equipment
Lack of monitor Identify which monitor Additional monitor
Monitor problem Early detection Equipment checking procedure
Design problem Assistance in diagnosis Better equipment design
Control problem Adequate security measures Better equipment maintenance





Distraction Healthy patient Additional training
Error of judgment Knowledge of the patient Fatigue alleviation routine
Error of diagnosis Re-check
Error of confusion Awareness of danger


















Communication problem Good communication Improved communication
Co-ordination problem Relief anaesthetist Improved staff
Inadequate supervision Staff change





Information transmission problem Good supervision Improved environment
between services Procedures Improved supervision
Planning problem Adequate resources More manpower
Lack of support from Other factor Quality insurance activities




Due to the emergency nature
Other factor
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mostly the practitioners that are interested in report-
ing systems. Moreover, reporting and analytical
approaches must be simple to use and produce
results that make sense for them. In this paper, we
put forth the idea of scenarios, characterized by some
specific combinations between the different factors
at the origin of accidents: contextual, organizational
and cognitive factors. The unit of analysis is semantic
which, in turn, has certainly more significance for
practitioners. Indeed, we believe that the concept of
scenarios could provide a mechanism for abstracting
common generic patterns of complex system break-
downs. However, future studies should investigate
the predictive validity of this analytical approach.
Another important direction for analysis of reported
data is the study of accident and error detection and
recovering processes. Although the consequences of
an accident depend largely upon the amount of time
and activities that intervene between the accident
and its discovery, there have been very few studies on
that theme. Reporting systems could serve to inves-
tigate this research issue, one with considerable the-
oretical and practical interest. Finally, it is worth to
noting that, although reporting systems constitute a
valuable tool for a better understanding of the gene-
sis of accidents, under no circumstances are they a
substitute for field observations and in-depth
knowledge of the domain in order to make sense of
the reported data.
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Table 3. Anaesthesia, procedure and time.
Procedure Monitors in use When did it occur?
Cardiothoracic Airway pressure gauge Time of day
Cardioversion Airway temperature Month
Dental Auto-disconnect alarm
Diagnostic including imaging/biopsy Manual disconnect alarm At what phase?
Electroconvulsive therapy Capnograph Pre-induction
Endoscopy Cardiac output Induction
Ear, nose and throat Central venous pressure Maintenance
General surgical Doppler praecordial Emergence






Casualty or emergency room
Obstetric Mass spectrometer
Day-surgery
Oncology Nitrous oxide analyser
Delivery room








Urology Peripheral nerve stimulator
Induction room












Regional or nerve block Praecordial
Sedation Oesophageal





Table 4. Persons involved.
Reporter Present at the time Patient age group
Staff member of the incident Neonate
Visitor Anaesthetist 1 yr
Degree of training Surgeon 1–14 yr
Year 1 2 3 4 5 Nurse 14 yr
Anaesthetist experience Technician
ASA Grade
0–10 yr Maintenance staff
10–20 yr Visitor
1 2 3 4 5
20 yr Emergency
Yes/No
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Table 5. Detection, evolution and aftermath.
Detected by? Duration of incident After the incident
Self Transitory (5 min) Was there a feeling of:
Other person (specify) Prolonged (5 min) Anger at the equipment
None Anger at myself
How?
Immediate effects Anger at the team
Alarm
Cardiac arrest Anger at the organization
Ask/call
Major physiological change Culpability
Checking procedure
Minor physiological change An unanswered question
Problem suspicion
Physical injury Did you notice:
Based on expectancy




Long-term effects Difficulty of attention
Other (specify)
Awareness Obsessive thoughts
Death Loss of pleasure
When? Major morbidity Fear
Immediately Minor morbidity Other emotion
Delayed Prolonged stay
By how long? Unplanned high-dependency stay
Never Nil
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